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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that some health professionals believe consent procedures 
for the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) should become less 
rigorous than those currently used for invasive prenatal testing. In this paper, we consider 
the importance of informed consent and informed choice procedures for protecting 
autonomy in those prenatal tests which will give rise to a definitive result. We consider 
whether there is anything special about NIPD that could sanction a change to consent 
procedures for prenatal diagnosis or otherwise render informed decision-making less 
important. We accept the claim that the absence of risk of miscarriage to some extent 
lessens the gravity of the decision to test compared with invasive methods of testing. 
However, we also claim that the definitive nature of the information received, and the fact 
that the information can lead to decisions of great significance, makes NIPD an important 
choice. This choice should only be made by means of a rigorous and appropriately 
supported decision-making process (assuming that this is what the pregnant woman 
wants). We conclude that, on balance, consent procedures for NIPD should mirror those 
for invasive testing, albeit without the need to emphasise procedure-related risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, pregnant women in the UK are offered a number of antenatal or prenatal tests, 
results of which will vary from probabilistic to definite. Of these tests, those that can give 
a woman or couple a definitive result (that is, virtual certainty about the presence or 
absence of a particular fetal abnormality)1 are currently invasive and therefore carry a 
small but significant risk of miscarriage. However there is a new technology emerging, 
non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD), which would allow women to obtain definitive 
information about their fetus without the risk of miscarriage. [20 The introduction of NIPD 
could, if made widely available, ultimately bypass invasive testing in pregnancy. Recent 
empirical evidence has suggested that healthcare professionals regard ‘informed decision-
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making’ for NIPD as less important than for invasive testing. [17] In light of this finding, 
this paper explores the decision-making procedures that ought to accompany NIPD and 
claims that NIPD should not reduce the emphasis on the gravity of the information that 
could arise from this testing. 
 
One of the key principles behind prenatal testing is that women are entitled to exercise 
reproductive autonomy. Informed choice and informed consent procedures are usually 
considered to protect this. [3] Obtaining informed consent or promoting informed choice 
for diagnostic tests or screening in pregnancy is well accepted as standard professional 
practice and is reflected in guidance in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. [9, 14] 
Professional deliberations on this topic are less about the appropriateness of women 
giving consent per se; instead the focus is on how to ensure consent and choice are 
genuine and well-informed. Given there is evidence to suggest that informed decision-
making procedures may be threatened by the introduction of the new technology of NIPD 
[17] and given the wider ethical context of this emerging technology, [1, 2,10] it is timely 
to critically review the value of informed decision-making in prenatal testing and how this 
should impact decision-making procedures for NIPD. 
 
In this paper, we argue that the introduction of NIPD should not radically change informed 
decision-making procedures for definitive prenatal testing. We first briefly describe NIPD 
and discuss the concepts of informed choice and informed consent. After a brief 
description of a recent empirical study, we then consider whether there is anything about 
non-invasive diagnosis that means autonomy should play a lesser role, one that would 
justify an erosion of, or change to, informed decision-making procedures for prenatal 
diagnosis. To do this we consider the significance of the absence of risk to the pregnancy 
that is a feature of NIPD. We also discuss the differences between a decision to test, and 
the decisions following receipt of results. Included in this discussion is the consideration 
that the nature of definitive information may have a bearing on a woman’s decision 
whether to undergo NIPD. We also consider the implications of offering NIPD on a 
‘routine’ basis in pregnancy before very briefly considering the policy context. 
We claim that the absence of risk in NIPD is a justifiable motivation for a modification to 
informed decision-making procedures for prenatal diagnosis, in that less time will need to 
be spent discussing procedure-related risk. However any policy about informed decision-
making for NIPD must take account of the definitive nature of the information, the 
potential impact of the knowledge, and of any action resulting from that knowledge, as 
these features of NIPD are more akin to prenatal diagnosis than screening (which only 
provides a risk-based and not a definitive result). This makes decisions about whether to 
undergo NIPD potentially very important. We conclude that informed decision-making 
procedures for NIPD do not necessarily need to be as stringent as those for invasive 
testing methods, particularly if NIPD is to be offered to all pregnant women (as a policy of 
stringent informed decision-making would have significant resource implications for pre-
test counselling). We claim, though, that informed decision-making should be subject to 
more thorough procedures than non-invasive screening tests, as these provide only 
probabilistic results.  
 
 
1. CONTEXT OF NIPD AND INFORMED DECISION-MAKING 
 
(a) Clinical Background to NIPD 
A pregnant woman seeking to discover information about the health of her fetus can 
currently consider several options for prenatal screening or diagnosis. These can be either 
invasive or non-invasive and will provide a range of information about the health of the 
fetus. Existing non-invasive technologies that do not pose a risk to the pregnancy include 
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blood tests to measure levels of certain biochemical markers, or first-trimester ultrasound 
to assess a risk of Down’s syndrome. These are routinely offered to pregnant women as 
part of antenatal screening programmes.2 However, NIPD departs from these technologies 
in that a biochemical test early in pregnancy provides only a probabilistic or risk-based 
result and ultrasound may provide information that has uncertain diagnostic significance.3 
Under existing practice, more definitive information about the health of the fetus can be 
obtained using amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (CVS), but these are invasive 
and carry a small but significant risk of miscarriage.  
 
The necessity of risking a pregnancy to obtain a definitive diagnosis about the health of a 
fetus may soon be removed. Recent advances have given rise to non-invasive testing 
methods, which can detect cell free fetal DNA (ffDNA) in maternal blood via a blood test. 
[6] ffDNA is derived from placental cells and crosses over into the maternal bloodstream, 
circulating as small fragments. These DNA fragments, reliably detected from around seven 
weeks’ gestation, comprise only a small proportion of the overall cell-free DNA (cfDNA) in 
the maternal bloodstream and are not currently distinguishable from maternal DNA. NIPD 
therefore detects gene changes not present in the mother, such as fragments of Y 
chromosome DNA or paternally-inherited gene changes. ffDNA is rapidly cleared from the 
maternal bloodstream within hours of delivery, making it feasible for use regardless of 
whether a woman has been pregnant previously. Accurate prenatal diagnosis using NIPD 
has already been reported for conditions such as achondroplasia (short stature), cystic 
fibrosis and x-linked conditions. [19] As techniques that make use of measurements of 
molecular weight improve, NIPD may also become possible for chromosomal conditions 
such as Down’s syndrome. Additional non-medical applications are also emerging, 
including commercial prenatal gender and paternity testing. If its reliability is proven, the 
main advantages of NIPD will be that: it can be undertaken earlier in pregnancy (perhaps 
before significant maternal-fetal bonding has occurred, and where medical termination 
may still be possible); and that it is safer than invasive diagnosis. It is essential to 
appreciate that NIPD would provide information of similar diagnostic power as 
amniocentesis or CVS, but without the procedure-related risk.  
 
As and when NIPD becomes available, it will have implications for reproductive and public 
health policies, for example whether it should be used to replace existing screening tests 
with a diagnostic procedure, whether it will become a new intermediary step between 
screening and invasive testing or whether it will replace invasive testing altogether.4 
Notwithstanding established professional practices and legal obligations, we might expect 
the process of NIPD to incorporate a procedure of informed consent or informed choice, 
particularly given that one of the key motivations for prenatal testing is to allow women to 
exercise autonomy. In the context of NIPD, exercising autonomy may manifest itself in a 
number of ways, for example in choosing whether to continue a pregnancy when a fetus 
has an abnormality and thus planning to care for a child with a disability or in choosing 
appropriate options for labour (as is beneficial when a fetus has haemophilia).  
 
(b) Informed Decision Making 
For the purposes of this paper, we have assumed that reproductive decision-making is of 
moral importance. There are four reasons why prenatal informed decision-making is 
usually valued. First, informed decision-making is instrumental to promoting best 
interests. Women are usually in a privileged position of knowing their best interests and 
arguably what is best for their possible future children. Making an informed decision in 
prenatal testing can lead to better outcomes, such as satisfaction with the decision made. 
[7] Second, a well-designed informed decision-making procedure can protect women from 
being deceived or coerced. [12] Third, such procedures exercise respect for autonomy and 
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autonomy is intrinsically valuable. Finally, and more pragmatically, informed decision-
making can also protect health professionals from complaints and litigation. [11, 13] 
   
In medical ethics, we tend to describe the process of prior deliberation and agreement to 
any health intervention as ‘informed consent’. In health psychology the terms ‘informed 
choice’ and ‘informed decision-making’ are also used, and these are prominent in 
literature about prenatal diagnosis and NIPD. For clarity, we will briefly describe the terms 
‘informed choice’ and ‘informed consent’ and their overlap.5 
 
Informed choice and informed consent are both intended to enable individuals to make 
informed decisions, with the implicit common feature that this is in line with what that 
individual wants. Informed consent is agreement by the patient under conditions that the 
patient has capacity, is appropriately informed and makes a voluntary decision. An 
informed choice is one that is based on relevant knowledge, is consistent with the 
decision-maker’s values and is behaviourally implemented (enacted). [7] As Marteau 
explains, informed choice and informed consent differ “in two important ways. First, 
informed consent is not explicitly concerned with the understanding of those not 
consenting”. [8, first emphasis added] “Second,… [informed consent] is not explicitly 
concerned with the consenting individual’s values.” [8] 
 
While incorporating an individual’s values into the notion of informed decision-making has 
some problems, for example individuals’ changing and conflicting values, [8] both choice 
and consent imply respect for (and protection of) individual autonomy. In this paper we 
focus on this common attribute. There are procedural and conceptual differences 
between informed choice and informed consent, but these do not affect the present 
discussion. We are interested in how to adequately protect autonomy in NIPD using 
informed decision-making procedures and so use the term ‘informed decision-making’ to 
refer to both informed consent and informed choice. The broad conclusion of this paper 
will therefore apply to both concepts and the conclusions should be meaningful in both 
bioethics and health psychology. In the following section we will explore possible reasons 
why the informed decision-making procedure for NIPD may be less rigorous than for 
current invasive prenatal testing. 
 
2. HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ VIEWS, RISK ELIMINATION AND ROUTINISATION 
 
a) Health professionals’ views of informed decision-making for NIPD 
Recent empirical research suggests that, if left unchecked, development of NIPD could 
lead to an erosion of informed decision-making. [17] Results of a vignette-based survey of 
231 UK obstetricians and midwives indicate that this group of professionals believe that 
there would be less need for formal written consent to NIPD for Down’s syndrome 
(assuming this were available), when compared with invasive prenatal diagnosis. 
Additionally, respondents believed that the offer and uptake of the test need not take 
place on a different day, creating a ‘one-step’ procedure. This would be contrary to 
current practice, in which amniocentesis or CVS is carried out on a different, later day to 
the initial screening blood test. Any move to this one-step diagnostic procedure would 
mean only one point of contact between the woman and the healthcare professional, 
which raises concerns about ‘neglecting’ autonomy [16] in the sense that the simplicity 
and speed of the procedure may be favoured over giving women adequate time for 
reflection, deliberation, and seeking further information if required.  
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b) Would the removal of risk sanction an erosion of informed decision-making 
procedures for NIPD? 
The risks and harms associated with a blood draw necessary for NIPD are minimal, and so 
the prenatal testing process may now be thought of as technically less problematic and 
less risky when compared with invasive testing. Studies have shown that decliners of 
screening sometimes cite the risk of a follow-up test as their reason not to undergo 
screening. [4] It may be that the clinicians who participated in the study focused on 
procedure-related risk as the predominant justification for formal written consent and a 
policy of separate appointments for offer and uptake of invasive testing [personal 
communication with Lyn Chitty]. Certainly, this would be a plausible argument in favour of 
less rigorous decision-making procedures for NIPD. This attitude would also echo a 
previous observation from a screening context, in which the relative lack of procedure-
related risk impacts the requirement for women to be given full information and time to 
reflect. [13] It may also be worth noting that the absence of risk of miscarriage would 
reduce the scope for healthcare professionals being accused of negligence (i.e. inadequate 
information that leads to miscarriage). [13] 
 
There may also be an assumption that certainty and information about the genetic status 
of the fetus are fundamentally good. If so, it may be that the only essential information for 
women considering the test is that they will receive a definitive answer without risk to 
their pregnancy. However, it is not necessarily the case that definitive information is 
always perceived as a good thing. The definitive nature of the NIPD results may have 
significant bearing on how a woman perceives her situation and how she wishes to 
proceed through the remainder of her pregnancy. A probabilistic result would offer some 
information by providing an indication of the likelihood of the fetus having certain 
conditions, but would still leave open the possibility that the fetus did not have those 
conditions. While one woman may undergo further tests to resolve this uncertainty, 
another woman (particularly one who would not terminate a pregnancy for reasons of 
congenital abnormality) may not want to know for certain the status of her fetus. She may 
prefer to remain in a state of hope that her child will not have a particular condition rather 
than continue a pregnancy with the certainty that the child will. This attitude may prevail 
even if a no-risk test is available.  
 
Given that information derived from NIPD will be definitive, it may, depending on how 
NIPD is implemented, remove the opportunity for women to make their next decision (to 
proceed to definitive testing, or continue the pregnancy taking on board the probabilistic 
information received) without knowing the exact status of the fetus. That is, women will 
be making their decision based on much greater certainty as opposed to the probabilistic 
result from a screening blood test. This may be problematic, as we have already noted. 
Further, post-test decisions (whether to continue the pregnancy or not) based on 
certainty are arguably of a different type to those based on probability and this could 
fundamentally affect a woman’s subsequent experience of her pregnancy. The 
information a woman receives can be extremely important, and might have a significant 
impact on the way she perceives her fetus and pregnancy. For these reasons, women 
should have sufficient time to decide whether they wish to have definite knowledge. This 
in itself has implications for informed decision-making, as over-emphasising a lack of 
procedure-related risk may mean that women under-appreciate the certainty that will be 
forthcoming, and the lost opportunity to accept uncertainty highlighted above. 
 
To consider NIPD as akin to a blood test rather than amniocentesis or CVS would therefore 
be to regard the avoidance of a risk of miscarriage as the only morally significant 
dimension to the decision whether to test.6 When a woman chooses to undergo NIPD, she 
is participating in a decision to be informed about the genetic status of her fetus. While 
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one woman may use the diagnosis to prepare for having a child with a disability, or to 
manage her pregnancy and delivery, another woman may terminate the pregnancy on the 
basis of the information she receives.7 Unlike current non-invasive methods, the test 
result will be definitive, which, for those who undergo the test, will remove the option of 
‘leaving it to chance’ whether they bear a child with a disability.  
 
A key aspect to our position is that it is important, psychologically, that women are given 
time for reflection on whether to undergo testing. It has also been suggested by Scully at 
al that the time taken to deliberate allows individuals to exercise their moral agency. [15] 
They claim that an individual facing decisions about genetic testing may ‘slice up’ their 
decision making to “preserve a cognitive and affective space within which he or she can 
continue to perceive the situation sensitively and accurately, and recognise his or her 
moral responsibilities within it.” [15, p216] It is therefore important that there is 
appropriate time for reflection, to allow women the ‘space’ to come to their decision.  
 
One possible objection to this cautious approach is that the purpose of the test is merely 
to gather information, which is not of itself a moral decision. The objection may be that 
the morally significant decision would be what action, if any, is then taken on the basis of 
that information. However, we maintain that the decision whether to receive this kind of 
information in the first place is a moral one. If a woman chose not to receive this 
information, she would be taking some responsibility for the possibility of bearing a child 
with a disability. Also, for those women who would consider terminating the pregnancy on 
the grounds of disability, choosing to receive the information may be to act on the 
principle that the status of the fetus may have a bearing on whether they would 
terminate. We claim that on these grounds, the decision whether to receive the 
information is itself morally relevant. If the decision whether to undergo NIPD is made on 
the same day as it is offered, some women may find themselves making only a nominal 
choice about a morally-relevant and non-trivial matter. 
 
c) Routinisation 
Having argued that women should be given sufficient time and information to decide 
whether to receive definitive information about their pregnancy, and that the decision to 
receive information is a moral one, we have established that removal of risk of miscarriage 
is not the only significant change NIPD would bring to prenatal testing.  
 
We will now briefly consider the possible impact of ‘routinisation’ of prenatal testing via 
NIPD.  
 
Three relevant aspects of this debate are: (i) the effect of the timing of the process; (ii) 
whether women may feel there is an expectation to have the test; and (iii) whether 
lessening the formal decision-making process may be to underplay the importance of the 
decision. 
 
It may be suggested that the risk-free and relatively simple process of NIPD may 
encourage ‘routinisation’, that is a standard offer and uptake of this test by most pregnant 
women. While routinisation can increase efficiency and improve uptake, it could also 
potentially undermine the decision-making process. For example, routinisation may 
further encourage a one-step process in which women may not have sufficient time for 
deliberation and information gathering.  
 
Second, routinisation may also give rise to an expectation that women will undergo NIPD, 
as has already been suggested in the context of NIPD [2] and screening. [13, 18] If this was 
the case, then routinisation may not reflect an appropriately informed decision. Women 
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would need time for reflection to make a well-informed and considered decision that took 
account of all of their values, not just those relevant to the risks associated with the 
procedure.  
 
Third, same-day testing and the removal of written consent may de-emphasise the 
importance of the decision whether to undergo the test. While NIPD is risk-free and 
clinically preferable, these features do little to lessen the moral significance of the choice 
to receive the information. Wrapped up in the choice over whether to undergo NIPD may 
be values regarding disability, termination, and practical considerations about the family 
dynamic and whether one is adequately prepared to care for a child with a particular 
medical condition.  
 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
So far the discussion has not included any particular presumptions as to the model of 
NIPD that may be introduced into clinical practice. We have, however, focused our 
discussion on diagnostic testing for all pregnant women. We intend that our 
recommendations for an intermediary type of decision-making procedure should apply to 
all NIPD, whatever the model of service delivery that is eventually adopted.  Yet we also 
recognise that while ideally every woman would be given full information, counselling 
where appropriate, and sufficient time for deliberation, there are resource limitations to 
achieving such standards. There would be an enormous challenge to resources if NIPD 
were to become routinely offered to every pregnant woman were our requirement for 
comprehensive counselling adhered to. But at the very least, we assert that pre-NIPD 
counselling and information provision should include providing information about the test 
when women first book in for antenatal care and then a verbal discussion at the first 
antenatal appointment, before blood is taken at a later appointment. However, a more 
comprehensive discussion of the exact mode of informed decision-making is currently 
limited as we do not yet know exactly which model of service delivery for NIPD will be 
implemented. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Initial evidence has suggested that health professionals believe the process of pre-test 
decision-making could change between invasive prenatal diagnosis and NIPD. [17] Pre-test 
counselling and information provision for invasive testing concentrates, justifiably, on two 
important aspects: the procedure-related risk of the test and the possible outcome of the 
test. NIPD will remove the need to discuss procedure-related risk, however it will not alter 
the information women will receive: that is whether or not a fetus is affected with a 
particular genetic condition. If decision-making processes for NIPD fail to reflect this, 
women may, given the non-invasive nature of this test, fail to appreciate the potential 
significance of the information they may receive. 
 
The procedures relating to informed choice and informed consent for NIPD ought to 
reflect the importance of autonomous reproductive choice. The clinical simplicity of NIPD, 
and the fact that it carries no risk to the pregnancy, are good reasons in favour of having 
straight-forward formal procedures for decision-making. However, we have argued in this 
paper that the procedure should not be changed radically from existing practice for 
invasive diagnostic testing. This will require appropriate commitment of resources for pre-
test information provision and discussion. This is because, we have claimed, the diagnostic 
nature of the results may put a pregnant woman in a very different position than 
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probabilistic results would. Further, the results she receives may lead to an important 
decision of great moral and emotional magnitude. We also claimed that information is not 
always necessarily a good, and that some women may (entirely reasonably) prefer not to 
know the genetic status of their fetus.  
 
It is not yet known exactly how (and if) NIPD will be introduced into clinical practice. But 
however it is offered, the formal decision-making procedure is likely to be slightly 
different to those for existing methods. We hope to have shown in this paper that while 
the removal of risk from diagnostic prenatal testing would have a significant positive 
impact on reproductive choice, there are other important moral considerations that mean 
the choice whether to undergo NIPD may not be simpler than the choice whether to 
undergo other non-invasive screening tests during pregnancy. 
 
The challenge is now to translate this debate into a set of practical and relevant 
recommendations for the introduction of NIPD into clinical practice, taking account of 
existing arrangements for antenatal care and resource limitations. This will necessitate 
working with health professionals, recipients of NIPD and relevant policy-makers to 
produce sound information and resources for wide implementation. 
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NOTES 
 
1. As ffDNA is derived from the placenta, there is a small chance that the genetic 
information in the maternal bloodstream may not be exactly representative of the 
foetus 
2. We recognise that the ‘routinisation’ of screening and testing in pregnancy is ethically 
contentious and has been debated in the ethics literature [5]. However, a substantive 
consideration of the nuances of the debate over routinisation is beyond the central 
scope of this paper. 
3. For example, a measure of the thickness of the nuchal fold (the thickness on the back 
of the fetus’ neck) that lies on the 99th percentile of the normal distribution may have 
no clinical significance, but it may also indicate a risk of Down Syndrome.   
4. Policy on how NIPD is to be offered to pregnant women is not yet determined and is 
the subject of an ongoing UK national research programme (RAPID:  
http://www.rapid.nhs.uk). NIPD could be offered to (i) replace antenatal screening 
programmes with a ‘one stop’ definitive indication of risk; (ii) as an intermediary step 
between antenatal screening and invasive diagnosis; or (iii) as a follow-up to antenatal 
screening instead of invasive prenatal diagnosis; in the same way that amniocentesis 
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is offered now. Which of (i) – (iii) is chosen will depend on the success rates for pilot 
studies of NIPD, financial implications and educational and counselling resources. A 
determination of the preferred model is therefore inappropriate at this stage and we 
do not adopt a preferred model in this paper, although we briefly discuss policy 
implications in Section 3. 
5.  Further analysis and comparison of these terms has been undertaken elsewhere. [8] 
6. Decision-making on the basis of probability, or uncertainty, can be problematic for 
different reasons. Making a decision on the basis of uncertain information involves a 
risk analysis. It is possible, for example, that a woman could terminate her pregnancy 
on the basis of the probability that the fetus carries a certain genetic condition, only 
to find that in fact the fetus did not have that condition. Indeed, avoidance of such 
problems of uncertainty forms part of the appeal of NIPD. 
7. This will, of course, depend on the clinical utility and validity of this test, and women’s 
acceptance of its reliability. 
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